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Enrollment Projections for Nebraska’s Medicaid
Insurance for Workers with Disabilities (Medicaid
Buy-In Program)

Mary G. McGarvey, Ph.D.
March, 2003

1. Introduction
Many persons with significant disabilities are unable to obtain health insurance in
the private sector that provides coverage of the services that enable them to live
independently and enter, remain in, or rejoin the workforce. For individuals with
disabilities currently receiving health care under Medicaid, the fear of losing their health
care and related services is one of the greatest barriers keeping such individuals from
maximizing their employment, earnings potential, and independence. For many
individual SSDI and SSI recipients, the risk of losing Medicare and Medicaid coverage
that is linked to their cash benefits is a risk that is an equal or greater work disincentive
than the loss of cash benefits associated with working.
To allow workers with income levels higher than SSI requirements to maintain
their Medicaid coverage, the federal government has provided states with an optional
“Medicaid Buy-In program.” The Buy-In allows qualifying people with disabilities
whose income levels are too high for them to receive SSI, to purchase Medicaid coverage
much like one would purchase any health insurance policy. The Medicaid Buy-In was
first made a state option through the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (Section 4733). The 1999
passage of TWWIIA expanded the number and type of choices states can make if they
decide to implement a Medicaid Buy-In program.
States primarily support working persons with disabilities through implementation
of Buy-In programs. Twenty-nine states (Bicameral Briefing on Medicaid Buy-in
Programs for Working Individuals with Disabilities, 2001) have adopted some form of a
Medicaid Buy-In program that enables persons with disabilities to continue eligibility for
Medicaid-financed services.
States with Buy-In programs implemented them following guidelines outlined in
either the Balanced Budget Act (1997) or in TWWIIA (1999). Older programs tend to
follow BBA guidelines and newer programs tend to follow TWWIIA guidelines.
Nebraska’s Buy-In program currently follows the BBA guidelines.
This report provides projections of the number of qualified unmarried
Nebraskans expected to enroll in the current Medicaid Buy-In program. (The current
policy is summarized in the table presented below.) To gauge the effect of changes in
specific policy parameters, we also estimate enrollment in the program under different
policy scenarios. These projections are based on a number of underlying assumptions.
We assume that all qualified Nebraskans have complete knowledge of the program,
there is no perceived social stigma attached to participation in the program, and that
enrollment for qualified individuals is costless.
The report is organized around the presentation of six tables of population
projections. After I describe the data and the general methodology, I present the detailed
model and assumptions used to calculate the estimates presented in the tables.
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Summary of Nebraska’s Medicaid Buy-In Eligibility Criteria
Income Eligibility

Test A:
Unearned Income < FBR
Test B:
Countable Income < 250%
FPG

Countable Income Disregards:
SSI (first $65 earned, $20 earned/unearned, 50%
of remaining), SSDI if in TWP, VA disability
payment, Worker’s Compensation, Civil Service
disability, Private disability insurance

Asset limits
Premium/Cost
Sharing

$4000 ind/$6000 couple
Net family income
200% FPG or less=$0
200-210%FPG=2% of
excess
210-220%=4%
Sliding scale
240-250% FPG=10%

Individual Premium
$716-1431=$0
$1432-1502=$29
$1503-1574=$61
$1575-1645=$96
$1646-1717=$134
$1718-1789=$175

Couple Premium
$968-1935=$0
$1936-2031=$39
$2032-2128=$83
$2129-2224=$130
$2225-2321=$181
$2322-2419=$237

Data Sources
The projections are based on the distribution of characteristics of individuals from 18 to
64 years of age with self-reported work disabilities from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) conducted jointly by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. These data are contained in the Annual Demographic Files for March 2000
and 2001.
There are a total of 2,064 persons aged 18 to 64 in the Nebraska samples where each
person represents an average of 498 persons. (According to the 2000 Census there were
1,028,826 Nebraskans between 18 and 64 years old, giving a sampling weight of .002
for the CPS sample of all Nebraskans 18 to 64.) The number of individuals in these
samples who have self-reported work disabilities is 180 or 8.72%.
We also use the national sample of 2,141 individuals with self-reported working
disabilities from the CPS March 2001 Supplement to estimate labor force participation
and earnings equations based on individual demographic characteristics and State
Medicaid eligibility criteria. These equations form the basis of predictions of who will
work in Nebraska and how much they will earn based on individual characteristics and
Nebraska Medicaid eligibility criteria.
Additionally, national and state information published by the US Bureau of the Census
and the Social Security Administration (SSA) is used to project the number of
Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities whose disabilities would qualify them
for SSDI or SSI. This category of individuals is classified as having severe work
disabilities.
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Projection Methodology
I use a sequential approach to project the number of enrollees in Nebraska’s
Medicaid Buy-In Program similar to Howe’s (“Projecting Enrollment in a Medicaid buyIn Program for Ohio,” by Steven R. Howe, 2001) methodology for projecting Ohio’s
enrollment. Howe classifies the population by SSDI/SSI participant group and then by
Medicaid and employment history status to estimate the number of state residents who
will both qualify and enroll in the program. By doing this, he takes into account the fact
that program participation differs by subgroups and can make more efficient use of
national and state statistics.
Although I use Howe’s general sequential approach, I supplement it with
predictions from econometric models estimated from the national CPS sample. The
econometric models assume that individuals’ choices, such as working or not working,
are continuous functions of demographic and state policy variables. Estimation of these
models using national data provides both conditional predictions of labor force
participation and labor supply under a specific program and provides estimates of the
effect of policy changes on individuals’ work choice.
In Sections 2 and 3, I supplement the Nebraska and national CPS samples with
relevant aggregate statistics published by the Census and SSA to estimate the number of
Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities and then to estimate those Nebraskans
whose disability qualifies them for federal SSDI or SSI disability benefits. In Section 4, I
present estimates of the number of Nebraskans who are unmarried and whose disability
and whose income and asset levels qualify them for the Medicaid Buy-In program under
Nebraska’s current policy parameters. The final section presents projections of the
number of qualified unmarried Nebraskans who will choose to work and enroll in the
current program. Appendix B examines the effect on Nebraska’s Buy-In enrollment
projections from changing a number of policy parameters. Projections are presented
under seven alternative policy scenarios.
2. Population of Nebraskans with Self-Reported Work Disabilities
In this section, I present the relevant characteristics of the Nebraska 2000 and
2001 CPS samples and use them to estimate the relevant population figures. When
possible, I compare these estimates to those based on Census or SSA sources to gauge
the reliability of the CPS sample estimates. I then use these estimates to project the
number of Nebraskans with reported work disabilities by SSDI or SSI status, and by
Medicaid and work experience status. These figures are presented in Table 1.
Work Disability: According to the CPS Nebraska samples, 89,714 Nebraskans between
18 and 64 years old, or 8.72%, report a work disability. A person is considered to have a
work disability if any of the following conditions were reported (a person might have
reported multiple conditions):
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A health problem or disability limits the kind or amount of work (89% of the 89,714
people)
A disability is the main reason for not working (31%)
An individual is not in the labor force because of a disability (22%)
Published data from the U.S. Census Bureau shows that 9.38% of Americans aged 16
to 64 have a work disability.
Employment: Of the 89,714 people with a work disability, 63.33% showed some
evidence of working or having worked recently, or at least of having wanted to work
recently.
 59.44% had worked at least once during the previous calendar year.
 48.89% had a job at the time of the interview and an additional 3.33% were looking
for work. The remaining people (47.78%) were not in the labor force.
 About 2.22% said at the time of the interview that they had tried to find a job last
year
Note that the population of all persons with work disabilities includes persons with both
serious and less serious work disabilities. The employment rates presented above are
much higher than would be found among the subset of people whose disabilities are
severe, such as persons who might qualify for SSDI or SSI.
Health Insurance: Of the 89,714 people with a work disability, only 17% reported that
they had no health insurance during the previous calendar year. People might have
reported having multiple forms of insurance, either because of simultaneous coverage or
because of serial changes in coverage. Thus, the following percentages add to more than
the percentage of people with coverage of any kind (83%).
21% reported Medicaid coverage.
14% reported Medicare coverage.
32% reported coverage through their current or former job or union.
34% reported some other form of health insurance, such as CHAMPUS (federal
employees), VA (veterans) or private insurance other than through their job or union.
SSDI and SSI Income: According to the Social Security Administration, 25,320
Nebraskans of all ages received SSDI in 2000. Although this amount is reported for all
ages, it should only be relevant for those under 65 years old since SSDI payments are
reported as SS retirement payments after the recipient reaches retirement age. If one
also assumes that relatively few Nebraskans under the age of 18 receive SSDI
payments, then the 25,320 figure represents 28.21% of the 89,714 Nebraskans from 18
to 64 with work disabilities.
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Based on the CPS Nebraska subsamples, there were 24,923 or 27.78% of
Nebraskans from 18 to 64 with work disabilities who received SSDI. This figure
assumes that no one in the sample received any retirement payments from Social
Security.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) reports that 14,368 Nebraskans
between the ages of 18 and 64 received SSI benefits in the year 2000. (This figure
includes 779 individuals who were 1619b recipients and thus received Medicaid
benefits but no cash payments.) Dividing this figure by 89,714, we find that, according
to SSA, 16.02% of Nebraskans with work disabilities received SSI in 2000. According
to the Nebraska CPS sample, however, only 11,466 or 12.78% of Nebraskans in this
group were SSI recipients in the year 2000. (Part of this discrepancy could be due to
that some of the 1619b recipients in the CPS sample were not counted as receiving SSI
benefits because they did not report SSI payments.)
The number of Nebraskans (aged 18 through 64) who received both SSDI and
SSI benefits in the year 2000 was 5,352 as reported by SSA (Table 43 in the 2000
Annual Statistical Report on SSDI Program). This corresponds to 5.97% of the 89,714
Nebraskans with work disabilities. In the CPS sample, 4.44%, or 3,983 Nebraskans with
work disabilities reported receiving both SSDI and SSI payments.
To estimate the proportion of Nebraskans aged 18 through 64 reporting work
disabilities who receive either SSDI or SSI benefits, one adds the proportions receiving
either benefit and subtracts the proportion receiving both. If we base this estimate on
our Nebraska CPS sample, we find that 36.12 % of our population received either SSDI
or SSI benefits in the year 2000. If we base this estimate on the SSA reports, we
estimate that 38.24% received at least one of the federal disability benefits. Thus, the
two sources’ estimates are relatively close suggesting that our CPS sample produces
reliable estimates. We base our projections on the SSA estimate and assume that 38.24
% of 89,714, or 34,307, Nebraskans from 18 to 64 years old with work disabilities
receive either SSDI or SSI benefits.
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Table 1: Projected Numbers of Persons with Work Disabilities
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64)

Persons Who
Receive SSDI
or SSI

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not
Receive
Medicaid
Total

Persons Who
Do Not
Receive SSDI
or SSI

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not
Receive
Medicaid
Total

All Persons

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not
Receive
Medicaid
Total

Evidence
Of Work
6,861

No Evidence
Of Work
10,028

Total
16,889

5,805

11,613

17,418

12,666

21,641

34,307

Evidence
Of Work
1,446

No Evidence
Of Work
964

Total
2,410

41,915

11,082

52,997

43,361

12,046

55,407

Evidence
Of Work
8,307

No Evidence
Of Work
10,992

Total
19,299

47,720

22,695

70,415

56,027

33,687

89,714

Page 6 of 41

Table 1 presents the estimated number of Nebraskans aged 18 to 64 with selfreported work disabilities by SSDI or SSI status and by evidence of work and Medicaid
status. According to these projections, about half of those receiving SSDI or SSI
benefits receive Medicaid and about 37% have some evidence of work. Of those not
receiving SSDI or SSI benefits, a little over 4% receive Medicaid and about 78% have
some work evidence.

3. Population of Nebraskans with Qualifying (Severe) Work Disabilities
Not every person represented in Table 1 has a disability that would meet the
Medicaid severe work disability standard. In this section, I use published information on
the U.S. disabled population and severely working disabled population by age and labor
force status to estimate the number of Nebraskans represented in Table 1 whose
disability would qualify them for SSI or SSDI disability benefits. The projections of the
numbers of Nebraskans who have a severe work disability by SSDI/SSI status and by
work evidence and Medicaid status are presented in Table 2.
According to the Census Bureau, 66.2% of 16 to 64 year olds who have a work
disability meet the severe work disability standard. (See Table 2, Labor Force StatusWork Disability Status of Civilians 16 to 74 year old). Using this figure, we estimate
that 59,391 Nebraskans (66.2% of the 89,714 Nebraskans with self-reported work
disabilities) have a severe work disability.
Following Howe (2001), I assume that all of the 34,307 individuals represented
in Table 1 who receive SSDI or SSI benefits have a severe work disability. Thus,
34,307 of Nebraskans with a severe work disability receive SSDI or SSI benefits and
25,084 do not. To find the distribution over work evidence status and Medicaid status of
the non-SSDI and non-SSI recipients with severe work disabilities, we use the fact that
those with severe work disabilities are less likely to be employed than those with lesssevere work disabilities.
The Census Bureau reports a national employment rate of 8.3% for 16 to 64 year
olds with a severe work disability. Because the employment rate of SSI disabled
recipients in Nebraska is the fifth highest in the nation (16.3%, or 243% of the national
employment rate of SSI disabled recipients) I adjust the national employment rates to
account for this fact. I estimate the employment rate of Nebraskans with severe
disabilities to be 20.2% (2.43 times the national rate of 8.3%). From these estimates, we
find that 11,997 of Nebraskans with severe work disabilities are employed (20.2% of
the 59,391 Nebraskans with severe work disabilities.)
The final step in estimating the number of Nebraskans with Medicaid-qualifying
disabilities by each category in Table 1 is to combine the CPS labor force information
with the estimated Nebraska employment rates. Given the assumption that those who
receive SSDI or SSI have a Medicaid-qualified work disability, according to the CPS
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sample, 6,861 Nebraskans with a severe disability are currently employed and receive
SSDI or SSI. Of the Nebraska SSDI or SSI disabled recipients, 27,446 are not
employed. Since there are a total of 11,997 employed Nebraskans with a severe
disability, 5,136 of these persons do not receive SSDI or SSI. Therefore, 19,948 of the
25,084 Nebraskans who have a qualifying work disability and who are receiving neither
SSDI nor SSI are not employed.
From the CPS sample, we estimate that 31,798 (57.39% of 34,307) Nebraskans
with self-reported work disabilities who are not receiving SSDI or SSI are currently
working and 23,609 Nebraskans in this group are not currently working. Based on our
previous estimate, we know that of the 23,609 non-working Nebraskans in this group,
19,948 have a qualifying work disability. From this we estimate that 84.5% of
Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities who are neither employed nor receiving
SSDI or SSI payments have a severe work disability.
Table 2 presents estimates of the number of Nebraskans with Medicaid
qualifying work disabilities categorized by SSDI/SSI status, work evidence and
Medicaid status. To estimate the proportion of Nebraskans not receiving SSDI or SSI
who have severe work disabilities by Medicaid status, we follow Howe (2001) and
assume that the proportion of non-employed non-SSDI/SSI recipients who qualify as
severely work disabled is the same as the proportion of those with no work evidence
who qualify as severely work disabled. Given this assumption, we estimate that there
are 10,179 Nebraskans with a Medicaid-qualifying work disability who receive neither
SSDI nor SSI and have no work evidence. Of these, 815 are currently receiving
Medicaid and 9,364 are not. not receiving or 84.5% of the 12,046 Nebraskans not
receiving SSDI or SSI with no work evidence.
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Table 2: Projected Numbers of Persons with Severe Work Disabilities
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64)

Persons Who
Receive SSDI
or SSI

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not
Receive
Medicaid
Total

Persons Who
Do Not
Receive SSDI
or SSI

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not
Receive
Medicaid
Total

All Persons

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not
Receive
Medicaid
Total

Evidence
Of Work
6,861

No Evidence
Of Work
10,028

Total
16,889

5,805

11,613

17,418

12,666

21,641

34,307

Evidence
Of Work
499

No Evidence
Of Work
815

Total
1,314

14,406

9,364

23,770

14,905

10,179

25,084

Evidence
Of Work
7,360

No Evidence
Of Work
10,843

Total
18,203

20,211

20,977

41,188

27,571

31,820

59,391
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4. Population of Unmarried Nebraskans with Medicaid-Qualified Work
Disabilities
Table 3 presents estimates of the number of unmarried Nebraskans who qualify
for the Medicaid Buy-In program for the working disabled by SSDI/SSI and Medicaid
status. These individuals represent the relevant population for our enrollment
projections under different policy scenarios. The figures in Table 3 are based on the
assumption that the proportion of unmarried Medicaid-qualified Nebraskans is the same
as the proportion of unmarried Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities given
their SSDI/SSI status.
In the CPS sample, 68.75% of Nebraskans with self-reported work disabilities
who receive SSDI or SSI are unmarried and 50% of those not receiving SSDI or SSI are
unmarried. From these estimates, we project that 36,112 Nebraskans from 18 to 64 have
Medicaid-qualified work disabilities. Of these, 16,944 are currently receiving Medicaid
and 19,168 are not.
Table 3: Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64)

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not Receive
Medicaid
Total

Receives SSDI or
SSI
16,080

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI
864

Total
16,944

7,504

11,664

19,168

23,584

28,608

36,112

Income and Asset Qualifications: Not all Nebraskans with severe work disabilities
meet the income and asset limitations of the Medicaid Buy-In program. For a working
individual with a Medicaid-qualifying disability to qualify for Medicaid Insurance for
Workers with Disabilities in Nebraska, two income tests must be passed. Test A
compares the individual’s unearned income to the Federal Benefit Rate (FBR). If
unearned income is less than the FBR, Test A is passed. Test B compares the
individual’s countable income to 250% of the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline
(FPG). If countable income is less than the FPG, Test B is passed.
We report in Table 4 the projected number of unmarried Nebraskans with
Medicaid-qualifying work disabilities that would qualify for the current Buy-In program
if they worked. We follow Howe (2001) and base earned income qualification on
actual earned income of those in the CPS sample who are currently working and on
projected income of those currently not working. Our projected earned income is the
predicted value from a regression estimated using the 2,141 individuals with reported
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work disabilities from the national CPS sample. The earned income prediction equation
is a function of the individual’s age, sex, education level and race as well as two
variables that depend on specific state Medicaid policy parameters. (Details of the
regression model are presented in Appendix A.)
Unearned income qualification is based on the reported unearned income of those
in the CPS sample. Because the CPS survey does not include information on individuals’
assets, we estimate assets by multiplying annual earnings from dividends, interest, and
rent by 20 (assuming an annual average return of 5%). Individuals qualify if their nonexempted assets are less than $4,000, the current Nebraska asset limit for unmarried
individuals.
According to the CPS sample, if every unmarried Nebraskans with self-reported
work disabilities were working, 45.5% of those receiving SSDI or SSI payments qualify
for the Buy-In and 72.3% not receiving SSDI or SSI payments qualify. The projections in
Table 4 assume that these proportions also apply to those with Medicaid qualifying work
disabilities. Based on this assumption, we estimate that 10,720 Nebraskans who receive
SSDI or SSI would qualify for the Buy-In if they worked and 9,072 who do not receive
SSDI or SSI would qualify if they worked.

Table 4: Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities
Who Qualify for the Medicaid Buy-In Program If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64)

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not Receive
Medicaid
Total

Receives SSDI or
SSI
9,112

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI
648

Total
9,760

1,608

8,424

10,032

10,720

9,072

19,792

Number of Persons Projected to Hold Jobs: To qualify for the Medicaid Buy-In
program the individual must be employed as well as have a Medicaid-qualifying
disability and meet the State Program’s income and asset requirements. Although the
individuals represented in Table 4 would qualify for the current program if they worked,
not all of these individuals will work. To estimate the number of persons who will work
under the current Buy-In program we first calculate the probability of employment for
each individual in the CPS sample and average over individuals by SSDI/SSI, Medicaid,
educational and work evidence status to find the proportion of persons in each category
who will work. We then multiply the resulting employment rates by the numbers of
income and asset-qualified Nebraskans in each category.
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The probability of being employed is modeled as an individual binary choice
variable that depends on the individual’s educational level, race, State of residence, asset
level and a State-specific Medicaid policy parameter. The model is estimated using the
national CPS sample of individuals with self-reported work disabilities. (Details of the
estimation are presented in Appendix A.)
Table 5 presents our projections of the number of unmarried Nebraskans between
18 and 64 years old who qualify for Medicaid Insurance for Workers with Disabilities
under the current State policy. Our model predicts that about 20% of unmarried
Nebraskans with Medicaid-qualifying work disabilities who currently receive Medicaid
qualify for the current Medicaid Buy-In Program and about 27% not currently receiving
Medicaid payments qualify for the current program. We project a total of 8,645
unmarried Nebraskans qualify for the program under Nebraska’s current policy
parameters.

Table 5: Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons
with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Current Buy-In Policy
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64)

Receives
Medicaid
Does Not Receive
Medicaid
Total

Receives SSDI or
SSI
1,591

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI
123

Total
1,714

298

1,776

2,074

1,889

1,889

3,788

Number of Persons Projected to Enroll in Current Program: The final step in
projecting the number of unmarried Nebraskans who will participate in Buy-In Program
is to estimate the probability that a qualified individual will choose to enroll. We follow
Howe (2001) and assume that the probability of enrollment falls as the Medicaid Buy-In
premium increases and that the probability of enrollment is smaller for those with
existing health coverage.
We also assume that qualified individuals who are receiving Medicaid currently
and who are either eligible for SSI payments or are eligible for Medicaid under SSI
1619b have little incentive to enroll. We assume that only 1% of this latter group will
enroll in the Buy-In. Of those who are covered by Medicaid currently but do not fall
into this group, we assume the probability of enrollment is 5% for those with other
health insurance and 10% for those with no other current coverage. The probability of
enrollment for those not covered currently by Medicaid is assumed to be 25% for those
with other health insurance coverage and 70% for those with no other coverage.
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Following Howe (2001), we assume that these probabilities are relevant when the
Medicaid premium rate is zero. For each 1 percentage point increase in the Medicaid
premium rate, the enrollment probabilities fall by 10%.
Table 6 presents our projections of the number of unmarried Nebraskans who
will enroll in the current Medicaid Buy-In program. These estimates were calculated by
averaging the probability of enrollment for each qualified individual in the CPS sample
over SSDI/SSI, Medicaid, educational and work evidence status to find the proportion
of persons in each category who will enroll. We then multiply the resulting enrollment
rates by the numbers of Nebraskans in each category who both qualify for the program
and choose to work.
Table 6: Projection of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will
Work and Enroll in the Current Medicaid Buy-In Program
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to64)
Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

16

6

22

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

177

850

1,027

Total

193

856

1,049

Receives
Medicaid

5. Effect of Policy Parameters on Projections
The results in Table 6 show that, under our model’s assumptions, approximately
1,049 unmarried Nebraskans from 18 to 64 will enroll in Nebraska’s Medicaid Buy-In
Program. Of these, we estimate that 193 initially received SSDI or SSI benefits and 856
did not. Our model predicts that only a small portion (about 2%) of the total enrollees
was initially receiving Medicaid benefits even though almost half (about 49%) of those
whose income and assets qualify them for the program are currently receiving Medicaid
coverage. The reason for this difference is the assumption that few (only 1%) of those
currently receiving Medicaid benefits will choose to enroll in the Buy-In if their income
and assets still qualify them for SSI payments or 1619b status.
To gauge the effect of changes in policy parameters (such as asset and income
limits) on Medicaid Buy-In enrollment, we recalculate the numbers of Nebraskans who
would qualify assuming they were employed, who qualify and choose to work, and who
enroll in the program under seven different policy scenarios. The policy scenarios are
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defined below and Appendix B reports the detailed projections. Table 7 summarizes the
effects of the different policies on the projected numbers of Nebraskans who qualify,
who both qualify and choose to work, and who choose to enroll. We report the
percentage change in the projected numbers for each scenario relative to the current
policy. We report not only the percentage difference in the projection totals but also
report the percentage difference by initial SSDI/SSI status.

Alternative Policy Scenario Parameters
Relative to Current Nebraska Medicaid Buy-In Policy
Policy
Scenario

Income Eligibility
Requirements

Asset Limits

Premium
Schedule

1

Same

$10,000

Same

2

Same

$20,000

Same

3

Same

Same

None

4

No Test A

Same

5

Higher Countable
Income Limit
(450% FPG)

Same

6

Same

$12,000

7

Higher Countable
Income Limit
(450% FPG) &
No Test A

$20,000

Premiums begin
at Lower Income
(150% FPG)
Sliding Scale
Premiums from
250% to 450%
FPG
Premiums begin
at Lower Income
(150% FPG)
Flat %10 Rate of
Income above
200% FPG
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Table 7
Percentage Increase in Projections under Policy i (i = 1, 2,…,7)
Relative to Current Nebraska Policy

Policy

Number Qualified
Given Employed
SSDI
No
Total
/SSI
SSDI
/SSI

Number Qualified and
Working
SSDI/
No
Total
SSI
SSDI
/SSI

Number Who Enroll
SSDI
/SSI

No
SSDI
/SSI

Total

1

0.0

2.4

1.1

0.0

4.0

1.7

0.0

0.8

0.67

2

0.0

2.4

1.1

0.0

4.0

1.7

0.0

0.8

0.67

3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

9.5

7.7

4

95.0

7.0

54.7

84.0

5.6

44.3

82.0

3.0

17.5

5

0.0

4.8

2.2

15.0

12.8

13.6

9.8

24.5

21.8

6

0.0

2.4

1.1

0.0

4.0

1.7

0.0

-2.3

-1.9

7

105.0

23.8

67.8

138.6

8.3

73.0

193.0

- 42.5

0.76

According to the estimated differences in Table 7, a change from Nebraska’s
current policy to either Policy 4 or 7 will have the largest effect on the number of
unmarried Nebraskans who will qualify for the Medicaid Buy-In program. These Policy
Scenarios eliminate Test A, the unearned income test. Under both policies, the
elimination of Test A benefits those currently receiving SSDI or SSI by a much greater
proportion than it benefits those currently not receiving SSDI or SSI.
Although both Policies 4 and 7 lead to approximately the same increase in the
number of SSDI/SSI recipients whose income and assets will qualify them, Policy 7
results in a larger increase in the proportion that will choose to work. Policy 7 has both
a higher break-even income level than Policy 4 and allows participants to hold more
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assets. Policy 7, however, has a much higher premium rate than does Policy 4. When
comparing the two policies’ enrollment projections, we see that, under Policy 7, total
enrollment remains about the same as under the current Buy-In program whereas Policy
4 leads to an increase in total enrollment of about 17.5%. Evidently, the high premium
rate under Policy 7 discourages those currently not receiving SSDI or SSI from
enrolling. There is a predicted 42.5% decrease in this group’s enrollment over the
current Policy’s projection. Both Policies 4 and 7 lead to a large increase in enrollment
projections of those currently receiving SSDI or SSI. Under Policy 7, the model predicts
a 193% increase in enrollment and, under Policy 4, the model predicts an 82% increase
in this group’s enrollment.
The Policy Scenario that is predicted to lead to the largest increase in enrollment
compared to the current policy is Policy 5. This policy increases the current 250% FPG
countable income limit to 450%. Although this leads to only a small increase in the
projected number of income-qualified individuals, it increases the projected number of
those who choose to work by about 13.6% and those who choose to enroll by 21.8%.
Policy Scenario 4 leads to the second largest increase in projected enrollment
with an increase of 17.5% predicted over the current policy’s projected enrollment.
Unlike Policy 5, most of the increase in projected enrollment under Policy 4 is due to an
increase in enrollment of those currently receiving SSDI or SSI. Policy 5’s increased
enrollment is due mostly to an increase in enrollment projections for individuals who
are not currently receiving SSDI or SSI benefits. It appears that the lower premium rates
under Policy 5 (compared to the current policy) have a relatively large positive effect on
the enrollment rate of those currently not receiving SSDI or SSI.
Summary and Conclusions:
This report presented projections for the number of unmarried Nebraskans from
18 to 64 years old who are expected to enroll in Nebraska’s Medicaid Insurance for
Workers with Disabilities program. The body of the report contains enrollment
projections under the current State policy and Appendix B contains enrollment
projections under seven policy scenarios that differ from the current policy in either
their income and asset qualifications or their premium schedules.
The predictions were generated using a sequential approach to estimating the
relevant populations of Nebraskans who qualify for the program by severity of their
work disability, by their asset- and income-qualification if they work, by their choice to
work if they qualify, and finally by their choice to enroll. The estimates were based on
observations of individuals from 18 to 64 years of age with self-reported work
disabilities from the Current Population Survey (CPS). These data were contained in the
Annual Demographic Files for March 2000 and 2001.
The sequential modeling strategy and assumptions were detailed in the text.
Information provided by aggregate statistics from the Census Bureau and the Social
Security Administration was combined with predictions from two econometric models:
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a model of individual earnings and a binary work-choice model. Details of the
econometric models’ specifications and the models’ parameter estimates are presented
in Appendix A. The estimation results were based on individual observations from
forty-eight states in the national March 2001 CPS sample.
When using the projection estimates in this report, it is useful to keep in mind
several caveats to the estimation procedure. First, the projection model was based on the
assumption that individuals have perfect knowledge of the rules of the Medicaid Buy-In
Program and that enrollment in the program is costless. For example, if an individual is
currently not receiving SSDI or SSI benefits based on a work disability, the individual
must be certified by a review board as having a qualifying disability. We assumed that
this process correctly identifies individuals with Medicaid-qualifying disabilities and
that this process is costless to the individual. (Of 15 individuals who applied for
certification in Nebraska during the past year, only 2 were accepted.) The model was
also based on the assumption that there is no stigma attached to public assistance
programs. For these reasons, the enrollment projections in this report correspond to
expected enrollment after the policy has been in place long enough for these
assumptions to more closely mirror reality.
As with any estimation process, the projection estimates are subject to sampling
error. The nature of the sequential approach precluded the calculation of standard errors
for the final projection estimates. Appendix A, however, reported standard errors for the
earnings predictions and work choice predictions that were used in the sequential
procedure. Because the size of the Nebraska CPS 2000 and 2001 sample of individuals
with reported work disabilities was small, we would expect that our projected
enrollment figures would have relatively large standard errors.
There were also some key variables related to whether an individual qualifies for
the Buy-In program that I could not measure directly. For example, individual assets
were approximated by scaled reported dividends, interest and rental payments. Also, in
Nebraska, SSDI payments are disregarded if the individual is currently in a trial work
period. My sample did not allow me to identify those individuals.
For these reasons, the projected enrollment numbers should be used as rough
benchmarks rather than precise values of the number of enrollees. More confidence
should be placed in the relative changes in enrollment projections due to differing
policy scenarios. These changes in projected enrollment relative to projected enrollment
under the current policy gauge the effect of permanent changes in policy parameters on
enrollment. Table 7 presented the percentage changes in projected enrollment by
SSDI/SSI status and found that eliminating Income Test A greatly benefits those
initially receiving SSDI or SSI benefits and increasing premium rates can substantially
reduce enrollment of qualified non-SSDI/SSI participants.
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Appendix A: Econometric Analysis
1. Model of Earnings
Our earnings model follows the commonly used specification,
k

log(earningsi ) = α + ∑ βi xi + ε i ,
j =1

where earnings is the individual’s reported personal earnings, the k explanatory
variables included in x are defined below, and the error term is assumed to be
independently distributed across individuals and have mean zero conditional on the
values of x.
Our CPS sample includes 2141 individuals from 18 to 64 years old with selfreported work disabilities. These individuals reside in 46 states (Massachusetts, Illinois,
Colorado and Nevada were omitted because I could not find complete information on
their Medicaid rules for the disabled). Of the 2141 individuals, only 646 reported
positive earnings from the previous year. Our sample size for the estimation is therefore
646 observations.
The final specification includes as explanatory variables nine demographic
variables and three individual- and state-specific Medicaid policy variables, each of
which has a statistically significant effect on log(earnings). The two continuous
demographic variables are the individual’s age and age-squared. The other demographic
variables are categorical. They include four educational attainment variables:
hsgrad = 1, if the highest degree attained is a high school degree; 0, if not
somecol = 1, if individual attended college but has no degree; 0 if not
assocdeg = 1, if the highest degree attained is an associate degree; 0, if not
colldeg = 1, if the highest degree attained is a bachelors degree; 0, if not
msdoc = 1, if the individual has a masters, professional, or doctorate; 0, if not
Two other categorical variables are
female = 1, if the individual is female; 0, if not
aindian = 1, if the individual identifies himself as an American Indian; 0, if not
The three policy variables are
beincome = the individual’s break-even level of income, if positive; 0, if not
The break-even level of income is the maximum amount of income that the
individual can earn in order to receive Medicaid coverage in the state of
residence. In Buy-In states, this depends on the FPG for family size,
the individual’s unearned income and the State’s specific disregards. In nonBuy-In states, this depends on the State-specific income limit and disregards as
well as the individual’s unearned income. Its general form is (income max +
disregards- unearned income) x 2
beincsq = beincome x beincome
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aslim20 = State-specific limit on individual assets to qualify for Medicaid
coverage, if the individual’s assets are below this maximum; 0, if not
Table A.1 reports the estimation results for the earnings equation. Since the
dependent variable is the logarithm of earnings, the estimated coefficients can be
interpreted as the percentage change in earnings associated with a small change in the
explanatory variable. The results suggest that a female earns less than a male of the
same age, living in the same state with the same educational attainment, break-even
income level and assets. American Indians also tend to earn less than other groups with
the same characteristics.
The positive effect of age and negative effect of age-squared is a common result
in earnings equations suggesting diminishing marginal returns to a person’s age (or
experience). We also see from the results that higher educational attainment is
associated with higher earnings.
The effects of the Medicaid policy variables on individual earnings depend how
large an individual’s unearned income is relative to the State’s income limit for
Medicaid coverage and how large an individual’s assets are relative to the State’s asset
limit. According to the point estimates, for those with positive-valued break-even
income levels, an increase in beincome tends to increase earnings but the magnitude of
the increase decreases as beincome increases. For small changes in beincome,

%Δ earnings ≅ Δbeincome[.00213% − (.000000014% × beincome)]
This result is consistent with the belief that low income-eligibility limits for Medicaid
coverage of individuals with work disabilities lead to decreased work effort. Individuals
with higher break-even income levels tend to have higher earnings (at least up to a
point.) This supports the impetus beyond the Medicaid Buy-In Program for individuals
with severe work disabilities.
For example, suppose the individual currently has a negative break-even income
level (beincome=0) and the State increases its income eligibility limit. If the
individual’s break-even level of income were still not positive, the policy change would
have no effect on the individual’s earning (beincome = 0). If, however, the individual’s
break-even income level increased by $1 due to the policy change, the model predicts
that earnings would increase by about .00213% (1 x .00213% ).

Suppose that the individual’s initial break-even income level were $20,000. In
this case, the same $1 increase in the income limit would lead to a smaller increase in
earnings. According to the point estimates, earnings would increase by approximately
.00185% (.00213% - .00028%). Thus, there appears to be diminishing returns to
increasing individuals’ break-even income levels. The regression results show that the
increase in individual earnings due to increasing break-even income levels (by either
increasing allowable disregards or increasing the income limit) is smaller the higher the
individual’s initial break-even income level.

Page 19 of 41

According to the point estimate, an increase of $1 in aslim is associated with a
.0037% reduction in individual earnings. This result, however, is relevant only for those
individuals whose assets are currently below the Medicaid asset limit for their State.
Thus, the result suggests that, for two individuals with the same characteristics
(including the same break-even income level), if each has assets less than her State’s
asset limit, then the person whose State’s asset limit is $1 higher than the other’s limit
has .0037% lower earnings. In this sense, individuals in states with higher Medicaid
asset limits tend to earn less.

Table A.1
Dependent Variable: log(earnings)
National CPS Sample of Individuals with Self-Reported Work Disabilities
646 Observations with Positive Earnings

β Estimate
Constant
AGE
AGESQ
FEMALE
HSGRAD
SOMECOL
ASSOCDEG
COLLDEG
MSDOC
AINDIAN
BEINCOME
ASLIM20
BEINCSQ

6.7828
0.0629
-5.5987e-04
-0.3631
0.4278
0.7609
1.0772
1.3188
1.5348
-0.7235
2.1293e-05
-3.7265e-05
-7.0894e-11

Standard
Error
0.5918
0.0296
3.5481e-04
0.1148
0.1585
0.1703
0.2508
0.2245
0.3573
0.3900
5.2106e-06
8.9876e-06
2.3302e-11

t-statistic

11.46179
2.12371
-1.57796
-3.16223
2.69966
4.46891
4.29552
5.87377
4.29538
-1.85543
4.08637
-4.14626
-3.04238

Significance
Level
0.00000000
0.03408184
0.11507535
0.00164050
0.00712654
0.00000931
0.00002017
0.00000001
0.00002018
0.06399908
0.00004945
0.00003840
0.00244435

Table A.2 presents the predicted earnings and the associated standard errors of
three representative individuals based on the estimated national model. Each individual is
43 years old (the median age of Nebraskans in the sample), is not an American Indian,
has earned a high school degree (the modal educational attainment value of the Nebraska
sample), and has a break-even income level of $42,654 (the median value for the
Nebraska sample). The first individual is a male with assets below the $4,000 asset limit
for Nebraska’s current Buy-In Program. The second is individual is a female with assets
below the $4,000 asset limit for Nebraska’s current Buy-In Program. The third individual
is a male with assets above the State’s asset limit.
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Table A.2
Predicted Earnings of 43 year old, High School Graduate, Non-American Indian,
Break-even Income of $42,654
FEMALE
One, if female;
Zero, if male

ASLIM20
State’s Asset Limit, if
Assets < Limit;
Zero, if Assets> State’s
Asset Limit

Predicted Annual Earnings
in year 2000 dollars
(Standard Error)

0

$4,000

$13,487.75
($1,548.54)

1

$4,000

$9,380.50
($1,113.50)

0

0

$29,970.84
($5,466.04)

The predicted earnings figures in Table A.2 show the predicted differences in
earnings associated with discrete differences in individual characteristics. (Because
earnings is a nonlinear function of individual characteristics, the estimates of β
presented in Table A.3 approximate the percentage change in earnings from only small
changes in individual characteristics.) As the results in Table A.2 show, the point
estimates in Table A.2 have relatively large standard errors. The sampling error
associated with the regression model’s predictions, however, is smaller than the sampling
error associated with Howe’s method to predict earnings of non-income earners. Howe
randomly assigns the earnings of working individuals to those in the sample who
currently do not work. The latter method ignores the relationship between individual
characteristics, such as education level, and individual earnings.
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2. Model of Work Choice

We use a probit specification to model work choice of those individuals whose asset
levels are below their state’s Medicaid asset limit and their earnings (or predicted
earnings for those currently not working) qualify them for their state’s Medicaid
program. Our specification is,
k

P (Worki = 1) = P( Z ≤ ∑ β s xi ) ,
s =1

where Worki = 1 if individual i earns a positive income and Worki = 0, if not.
The random variable Z is distributed as a standard normal random variable and
the k explanatory variables are described below. The model is estimated using only
1,387 observations from the original 46 state CPS sample of 2,141 18 to 64 year olds
with self-reported work disabilities. These individuals are those whose asset and
(projected) income levels qualify them for Medicaid coverage in their state.
The explanatory variables included in the final specification include a subset of
variables from the earnings equation: age and age-squared, the five educational
attainment variables, and beincome and beincsq, as well as the following new
variables:
black = 1, if the individual identifies himself as Black; 0, if not
states = 1, if the individual resides in Nebraska, Iowa, North Dakota, South
Dakota or Minnesota; 0, if not
asset20 = the individual’s interest, dividend and rental income scaled by 20
(assuming an annual 5% rate of return)
Table A.3 reports the parameter estimates of the probit estimation. We can
evaluate the direction of the impact that the explanatory variable has on the probability
of working by examining the sign of the coefficient estimate. According to the point
estimates, those with at least a high school degree are more likely to work than those
whose educational attainment is less than a high school degree. An individual who is
black is less likely to work than a non-Black individual of the same age, education, asset
level and break-even level of income. The probability of working increases with
beincome and decreases with the squared value of beincome. An individual with a
higher level of assets (but who still qualifies for Medicaid coverage) is more likely to
work and an individual from one of the five Midwestern states included in the states
category is more likely to work.

Page 22 of 41

Table A.3
Probit Model: P(Work=1) = P ( Z ≤ ∑ β i x j )
j

National CPS Sample of Income and Asset-Qualified Individuals
with Self-Reported Work Disabilities
1,387 Observations

β Estimate
Constant
HSGRAD
SOMECOL
ASSOCDEG
COLLDEG
MSDOC
BLACK
BEINCOME
BEINSQ
ASSET20
STATES

-1.08118
0.31890
0.63166
0.59179
0.51385
0.68892
-0.19724
0.17747
-0.84704
0.69292
0.44346

Standard
Error
0.087218
0.088037
0.105541
0.172366
0.174426
0.333839
0.089908
0.036533
0.160757
0.143731
0.191786

t-statistic

-12.396
3.622
5.985
3.433
2.946
2.064
-2.194
4.858
-5.269
4.821
2.312

Significance
Level
0.00000
0.00029
0.00000
0.00059
0.00322
0.03905
0.02825
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.02076

We convert the estimates based on the national sample of individuals with selfreported work disabilities to employment probabilities for individuals with severe work
disabilities by scaling the national estimates by .30, the ratio of the 2000 national
employment rate of the severely disabled to that of the disabled. Table A.4 reports the
resulting predicted employment probabilities and associated standard errors for six
representative individuals who qualify for Medicaid coverage. Each individual resides in
Nebraska (or one of the other Midwestern states included in the categorical variable
states.)
Two individuals do not have high school degrees and have no assets. One of these
individuals has the mean break-even income level ($46,550) of Nebraskans in the
national sample and one has a lower break-even income ($5,000). Two individuals have
graduated from high school but have not attended college and have the mean asset level
of Nebraskans in the national sample ($398). One of these individuals has a higher than
average break-even income of $60,000 and the other has break-even income of $5,000.
The other two individuals have attended some college (the most common education level
of Nebraskans in the national sample) and have assets of $1,500. One has the mean
break-even income level and the other has break-even income of $60,000.
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Table A.4
Predicted Employment Rate of Non-Black Medicaid-Qualified Nebraskan with
Severe Work Disabilities between 18 and 64 years
Educational
Attainment

Break-Even
Income Level (in
year 2000
dollars)

Less than
high school
degree

$46,550

$0.00

0.15059
(0.02497)

$5,000

$0.00

0.08724
(0.02207)

$60,000

$398

0.22896
( 0.01995)

$5,000

$398

0.15519
(0.02389)

$46,550

$1,500

0.28594
(0.00818)

$60,000

$1,500

0.28906
(0.00682)

High School
Degree

Some
College

Assets (in year 2000
dollars)

Predicted Employment
Rate
(Standard Error)
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Appendix B: Enrollment Projections
This appendix presents projected enrollments under seven Medicaid Buy-In policy
scenarios. These policy scenarios differ from the current Nebraska policy either in their
income eligibility requirements, their asset eligibility requirements, or their premium
levels. Three tables are presented for each policy scenario: projected number of
Nebraskans whose income and assets would qualify them for the program if they
worked, projected number of qualifying Nebraskans who will work, and the projected
number of qualifying Nebraskans who work and enroll in the program.
The percentage differences in the projections under the seven policy scenarios and the
projections under the current Nebraska policy that are presented in Table 7 in the text
are based on the tables in this appendix.
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Scenario 1: Same Income Requirement and Premium Schedule as
Current Policy. Asset Limit of $10,000 instead of $4,000.

Table 4.1:
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who
Qualify for Policy Scenario 1 If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

9,112

864

9,976

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

1,608

8,424

10,032

Total

10,720

9,288

20,008

Table 5.1
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 1
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

1,591

188

1,779

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

298

1,776

2,074

Total

1,889

1,964

3,853
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Table 6.1
Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 1
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

16

13

29

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

177

850

1,027

Total

193

863

1,056
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Scenario 2: Same Income Requirement and Premium Schedule as
Current Policy. Asset Limit of $20,000 instead of $4,000.

Table 4.2:
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who
Qualify for Policy Scenario 2 If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

9,112

864

9,976

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

1,608

8,424

10,032

Total

10,720

9,288

20,008

Table 5.2
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 2
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

1,591

188

1,779

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

298

1,776

2,074

Total

1,889

1,964

3,853
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Table 6.2
Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 2
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

16

13

29

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

177

850

1,027

Total

193

863

1,056
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Scenario 3: Same Income Requirement and Asset Limit as Current
Policy. No Premium.

Table 4.3:
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who
Qualify for Policy Scenario 3 If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

9,112

648

9,760

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

1,608

8,424

10,032

Total

10,720

9,072

19,792

Table 5.3
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 3
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

1,591

123

1,714

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

298

1,776

2,074

Total

1,889

1,889

3,788
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Table 6.3
Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 3
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

16

6

22

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

177

931

1,108

Total

193

937

1,130
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Scenario 4: Same Asset Limit as Current Policy.
Premiums begin at 150% FPG instead of 200% FPG.
Unearned Income is Disregarded (No Income Test A)

Table 4.4:
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who
Qualify for Policy Scenario 4 If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

15,544

648

16,192

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

5,360

9,072

14,432

Total

20,904

9,720

30,624

Receives
Medicaid

Table 5.4
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 4
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

2,603

123

2,726

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

869

1,871

2,740

Total

3,472

1,994

5,466
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Table 6.4
Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 4
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

25

6

31

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

326

876

1,202

Total

351

882

1,233
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Scenario 5: Same Asset Limit as Current Policy.
SSI Countable Income Limit is 450% FPG instead of 250%.
Sliding Scale Premiums from 250% to 450% FPG

Table 4.5:
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who
Qualify for Policy Scenario 5 If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

9,112

648

9,760

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

1,608

8,856

10,464

Total

10,720

9,504

20,224

Table 5.5
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 5
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

1,841

131

1,972

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

334

1,999

2,333

Total

2,175

2,130

4,305
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Table 6.5
Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 5
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

18

6

24

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

194

1,060

1,254

Total

212

1,066

1,278
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Scenario 6: Same Income Limits as Current Policy.
Premiums begin at 150% FPG instead of 200% FPG.
Asset Limit is $12,000 instead of Current $4,000 Limit

Table 4.6:
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who
Qualify for Policy Scenario 6 If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

9,112

864

9,976

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

1,608

8,424

10,032

Total

10,720

9,288

20,008

Table 5.6
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 6
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

1,591

188

1,779

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

298

1,776

2,074

Total

1,889

1,964

3,853
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Table 6.6
Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 6
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

16

13

29

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

177

823

1,000

Total

193

836

1,029
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Scenario 7: SSI Countable Limit is 450% FPG instead of 250%.
Unearned Income is Disregarded (No Income Test A).
Asset Limit is $20,000 instead of Current $4,000 Limit.
Premium is 10% of Income Above 200% FPG

Table 4.7:
Projected Numbers of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who
Qualify for Policy Scenario 7 If They Were Employed
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

16,080

864

16,944

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

5,896

10,368

16,264

Total

21,976

11,232

33,208

Table 5.7
Projected Numbers of Income and Asset-Qualified Unmarried Persons with Severe
Work Disabilities Who Will Work Under Scenario 7
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

3,235

125

3,360

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

1,272

1,921

3,193

Total

4,507

2,046

6,553
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Table 6.7
Projections of Unmarried Persons with Severe Work Disabilities Who Will Enroll
in Medicaid Buy-In Program under Policy Scenario 7
(Nebraska Residents Ages 18 to 64)

Receives SSDI or
SSI

Does Not Receive
SSDI or SSI

Total

Receives
Medicaid

32

2

34

Does Not Receive
Medicaid

533

490

1,023

Total

565

492

1,057
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